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Abs t r act
Th i s   p ap e r   s t u d i e s   p r i ci n g   an d   i n v e s t me n t   d e ci s i o n s   o n   a  co n g e s t e d   t r an s p o r t   co r r i d o r   wh e r e  
t h e   e l e me n t s   o f   t h e   co r r i d o r   ar e   co n t r o l l e d   by   d i f f e r e n t   g o v e r n me n t s .   A  co r r i d o r   can   be   an   i n t e r s t at e  
h i g h way   o r   r ai l way   l i n e ,   o r   an   i n t e r - mo d al   co n n e ct i o n .   We   mo d e l   t h e   s i mp l e s t   co r r i d o r :   t wo   t r an s p o r t  
l i n k s   i n   s e r i e s ,   wh e r e   e ach   o f   t h e   l i n k s   i s   co n t r o l l e d   by   a  d i f f e r e n t   g o v e r n me n t .   Each   l i n k   i s   u s e d   by  
t r an s i t   as   we l l   as   by   l o cal   t r af f i c;   bo t h   l i n k s   ar e   s u bj e ct   t o   co n g e s t i o n .   We   co n s i d e r   a  t wo   s t ag e   n o n -
co o p e r at i v e   g ame   wh e r e   bo t h   g o v e r n me n t s   s t r at e g i cal l y   s e t   cap aci t y   i n   t h e   f i r s t   s t ag e   an d   p l ay   a  p r i ci n g  
g ame   i n   t h e   s e co n d   s t ag e .   Th r e e   p r i ci n g   r e g i me s   ar e   d i s t i n g u i s h e d :   (i )  d i f f e r e n t i at e d   t o l l s   be t we e n   l o cal  
an d   t r an s i t   t r an s p o r t ,   (i i )  o n e   u n i f o r m  t o l l   o n   l o cal   an d   t r an s i t   t r af f i c,   an d   (i i i )  o n l y   t h e   l o cal   u s e r s   can  
be   t o l l e d .   Nu me r i cal   an al y s i s   i l l u s t r at e s   al l   t h e o r e t i cal   i n s i g h t s .   A  n u mbe r   o f   i n t e r e s t i n g   r e s u l t s   ar e  
o bt ai n e d .   F i r s t ,   t r an s i t   t o l l s   o n   t h e   n e t wo r k   wi l l   be   i n e f f i ci e n t l y   h i g h .   I f   o n l y   l o cal   t r af f i c  can   be   t o l l e d ,  
h o we v e r ,   t h e   Nas h   e q u i l i br i u m  t o l l s   ar e   i n e f f i ci e n t l y   l o w.   S e co n d ,   r ai s i n g   t h e   t o l l   o n   t r an s i t   t h r o u g h   a 
g i v e n   co u n t r y   by   o n e   e u r o   r ai s e s   t h e   t o l l   o n   t h e   wh o l e   t r aj e ct o r y   by   l e s s   t h an   o n e   e u r o .   Th i r d ,   h i g h e r  
cap aci t y   i n v e s t me n t   i n   a  g i v e n   r e g i o n   n o t   o n l y   r e d u ce s   o p t i mal   t o l l s   i n   t h i s   r e g i o n   u n d e r   al l   p r i ci n g  
r e g i me s   bu t   i t   al s o   i n cr e as e s   t h e   t r an s i t   t o l l s   o n   t h e   o t h e r   l i n k   o f   t h e   co r r i d o r .   F o u r t h ,   cap aci t i e s   i n   t h e  
d i f f e r e n t   r e g i o n s   ar e   s t r at e g i c  co mp l e me n t s :   wh e n   o n e   co u n t r y   o n   t h e   co r r i d o r   i n cr e as e s   t r an s p o r t  
cap aci t y ,   i t   f o r ce s   t h e   o t h e r   co u n t r y   t o   d o   t h e   s ame .     F i f t h ,   we   f i n d   i n t e r e s t i n g   i n t e r act i o n s   be t we e n  
o p t i mal   cap aci t i e s   an d   t h e   s e t   o f   p r i ci n g   i n s t r u me n t s   u s e d :   cap aci t y   wi t h   d i f f e r e n t i at e d   t o l l s   i s  
s u bs t an t i al l y   h i g h e r   t h an   i n   t h e   cas e   o f   u n i f o r m  t o l l s   bu t   o v e r al l   we l f ar e   i s   l o we r .   F i n al l y ,   i f   t r an s i t   i s  
s u f f i ci e n t l y   i mp o r t an t ,   i t   may   be   we l f ar e   i mp r o v i n g   n o t   t o   al l o w  an y   t o l l i n g   at   al l ,   o r   t o   o n l y   al l o w  t h e  
t o l l i n g   o f   l o cal s .    
Ke y wo r d s :   co n g e s t i o n   p r i ci n g ,   t r an s p o r t   i n v e s t me n t ,   t r an s i t   t r af f i c 
J EL:   H2 3 ,   H7 1 ,   R4 1 ,   R4 8  
We   be n e f i t e d   f r o m  t h e   co mme n t s   o f   J .   Br u e ck n e r   an d   S .   S t e i me t z   at   t h e   s y mp o s i u m  i n   h o n o r   o f  
K. S mal l   at   UC- I r v i n e   (F e br u ar y   2 0 0 6 ).   Mo r e o v e r ,   h e l p f u l   r e mar k s   o n   a  p r e l i mi n ar y   v e r s i o n   by   M.  
Ks o l l ,   G.   F r i e be l ,   C.   Nas h   an d   J .   P o u y e t   ar e   g r at e f u l l y   ack n o wl e d g e d .   We   t h an k   Car l a  Me d e s ma  Gar ci a 
f o r   r e s e ar ch   as s i s t an ce .   Th e   f i r s t   au t h o r   i s   g r at e f u l   t o   t h e   Un i v e r s i t y   o f   An t we r p   f o r   s u p p o r t   t h r o u g h   i t s  
TOP - p r o g r am;  t h e  s e co n d  an d  t h i r d  au t h o r  be n e f i t e d  f r o m f i n an ci al  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  F UNDI NG 
co n s o r t i u m  (6   t h   F r ame wo r k   r e s e ar ch   P r o g r am  o f   t h e   EC  (6 . 2 ))  o n   t h e   F u n d i n g   o f   t h e   Tr an s   Eu r o p e an  
Ne t wo r k s   (www. e co n . k u l e u v e n . be / f u n d i n g ).  1
0. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study pricing and investment decisions on a 
congested transport corridor of which each of the links are under the jurisdiction of a 
different government. Fiscal and ex penditure ex ternalities give rise to strategic pricing 
and  investment  behaviour  by  the  various  governments  involved.  Potential 
applicability  of  the  analysis  includes  investment  and  pricing  on  Trans  European 
Networks ( TEN s  basically a border-crossing highway, rail or multimodal system) 
in  Europe  and  the  interstate  highway  system  in  the  US.  Moreover,  it  is  equally 
relevant for pricing and investment decisions for inter-modal trips where the transfer 
facility  (ports,  airports,  freight  terminal)  and  the  upstream  or  downstream 
infrastructure  is  controlled  by  different  governments  or  by  different  private 
monopolists. The paper yields new theoretical insights, and it illustrates the results 
using numerical simulation analysis.  
  Interstate highways in the US and the TEN s in Europe have raised many 
policy questions. The two most prominent ones are on tolling and on investment. 
Allowing  tolling  by  different  governments  will  help  to  control  congestion  and 
generates resources for investments, but there is a fear of too high tax es on transit. 
When  it  comes  to  investment,  the  general  idea  is  that,  without  federal  help, 
investments  in  corridors  that  are  used  intensively  by  transit  would  be  too  low. 
Obviously  both  questions  are  linked:  allowing  tolling  may  help  to  overcome 
insufficient investment, but the net efficiency gain is not clear.
  The  approach  we  take  focuses  on  models  of  interregional  competition  and 
considers various tolling or user charge possibilities for the governments involved. 
Specifically, the model set up contains two serial links where each of the links is 
controlled by one government
1. The two links together form a corridor for transit 
traffic but each of the links is also used by local traffic. Both links are subject to 
congestion. We consider a two stage game where both governments set capacity in the 
first stage and play a Nash pricing game in the second stage. We follow De Borger, 
1 Government stands here for a public body that represents faithfully the interests of the local voters. 
This can be a country government, a state government in a federation, or the officials of a smaller 
constituency like a city controlling a port.  2
Proost, Van Dender (2005 ) in explicitly distinguishing 3 pricing regimes: (i) tolls can 
be differentiated between transit and local users; (ii) only one uniform toll can be 
charged to local and transit traffic; and (iii) only local users can be charged.
  This paper builds in a natural way on several strands of literature. First, a 
number of papers have considered pricing decisions for congested facilities, assuming 
a  simple  parallel  network  setting  and  excluding  tax  competition.  In  an  early 
contribution, Braid (1986) studied Cournot and Bertrand pricing rules for congested 
facilities in a symmetric private duopoly setting. This work was extended in various 
directions. For example, Verhoef, Nijkamp, Rietveld (1996) considered competition 
between a private road and a free-access road, and compared the second-best optimal 
tolls with those obtained when both roads are privately owned. De Palma and Lindsey 
(2000) use a bottleneck model of congestion and compare three types of ownership 
structure: a private road competing with a free access road, two competing private 
roads, and competition between a private and a public operator. More recently, Van 
Dender (2005 ) highlighted the important distinction between facility-specific traffic 
(e.g., traffic to access a port or airport) and other traffic on the network (e.g., local 
traffic  not  using  port  or  airport  facilities).  All  these  papers  implicitly  consider  a 
parallel network structure, they do not deal with tax competition, and they ignore 
capacity competition.
2 Second, De Borger et al. (2005 ) studied tax competition for 
transit  transport  in  a  simple  network  setting,  assuming  welfare-maximizing 
governments. However, unlike the current paper they focus on parallel networks and 
ignore the possibility of capacity investment as a strategic variable. Third, recent work 
looks  specifically  at  tax  exporting  in  the  transport  sector  within  a  serial  network 
setting. For example, Levinson (2001) analyses US States choice of instruments for 
financing transportation infrastructure. He shows that jurisdictions are more likely to 
opt for toll-financing instead of  fuel taxes, for example, when the share of non-
residential users is large.  His model does not include capacity decisions, however.  
Both De Palma and Leruth (1989) and De Borger and Van Dender (2005 ) do study 
two stage games in capacities and prices for parallel congested facilities. However, 
they  do  not  look  at  issues  of  tax  and  capacity  competition  on  a  serial  transport 
corridor. Moreover, they do not consider the range of pricing instruments nor the 
2 Acemoglu and Ozdazgar (2005 ) recently provide a detailed theoretical analysis of competition and 
efficiency  on  parallel  network  markets.  They  show  that  more  competition  among  oligopolists  can 
reduce efficiency on congested markets. Moreover, pure strategy equilibria may not exist, especially 
when congestion functions are highly nonlinear. However, they do not consider capacity competition. 3
interaction between capacity choice and pricing regimes studied in the current paper. 
Finally, our model setting can be compared to the problem of airline alliances studied 
by  Brueckner  (2001).  In  an  airline  alliance,  airlines  cooperate  in  the  international 
interhub (cross atlantic) markets, but the hubs are feeded and connected by local lines 
that are operated by each of the carriers. The alliance reduces competition on the 
interhub market but avoids the double margins on the feeding or connecting local 
lines.  Compared  to  Brueckners  paper,  we  concentrate  on  the  serial  network 
(forgetting the parallel interhub part) and we have congested infrastructure so that 
capacity decisions matter. Finally, we have local governments as decision makers 
rather than profit maximising airline operators.
  A number of interesting results are obtained. First, if transit can be tolled we 
find that all tolls are inefficiently high. However, if only local traffic can be tolled, 
Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently low: tolls are shown to be smaller than the 
marginal external congestion cost imposed on local traffic. The reason is that higher 
local tolls would attract too much transit traffic and hence reduce welfare. Second, the 
pricing  behavior  for  transit  transport  boils  down  to  a  variant  of  the  double 
marginalization  problem  for  successive  monopolies  in  the  industrial  organization 
literature (see, e.g., Tirole (1993)). It is shown that reaction functions in transit tolls 
are negatively sloped, so that increasing the transit toll in one region by one euro 
raises the total toll on transit users for the whole trajectory by less than a euro. Third, 
at  the  capacity  stage  of  the  game,  we  show  that  capacity  reaction  functions  are 
plausibly upward sloping: capacities are strategic complements. Fourth, we find that 
capacity changes strongly affect optimal tolling behavior. Higher capacity investment 
in a region not only lowers optimal tolls in this region under all pricing regimes, but it 
also  increases  tolls  on  transit  in  the  other  region.  Moreover,  there  are  interesting 
interactions  between  optimal  capacities  and  the  pricing  instruments  used:  optimal 
capacity with differentiated tolls is higher than in the case of uniform tolls but welfare 
is lowest; the largest optimal capacity results when only local tolls are used. Fifth , if 
transit is sufficiently important, it may be welfare improving not to allow any tolling at all, 
or to only allow the tolling of locals. Sixth, it is well known that, in a tax competition 
setting (see Kanbur and Keen (1993)), the smaller country has an interest to go after 
the revenue objective. We find similar behaviour in the case of uniform tolls.  
The paper concentrates on cases where there is always some local and some 
transit traffic, but some extreme cases are interesting too. First, if there is no transit, 4
there is no strategic interaction and the first best solution can be achieved if all traffic 
can be tolled. Second, when transit is tolled but local demand is negligible, the two-
stage game reduces to a pure standard duopoly problem in which the optimal tolls on 
transit are both independent of the level of capacity and of the slope of the congestion 
function.
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In a first section we describe the setup 
of the model. In Section 2 we look in detail at the pricing stage of the game. We 
study, for different tolling regimes, the countries optimal choice of transport tolls, 
conditional on given capacities and the tolls imposed on the other network link. We 
explicitly analyze the characteristics of the toll reaction functions and the resulting 
Nash equilibrium for the simplified case of linear demand and cost functions. Section 
3 deals with the first stage of the game, where regions decide on capacity, given the 
pricing behaviour at the second stage. In Section 4, we present some numerical results 
of the tax-capacity game to illustrate the main theoretical insights. We identify the 
welfare losses due to the lack of coordination between governments and we analyze 
the importance of three parameters: the share of transit, the slope of the congestion 
function and the relative size of the two countries.  Finally, Section 5 concludes with 
some generalisations and caveats. 5
1. Model structure
  The simple setting we consider consists of two serial links; it is assumed that 
pricing of each link is the responsibility of a different government. We assume each 
link  carries  local  traffic  and  transit  traffic.  Local  traffic  uses  only  the  local  link. 
Transit traffic, by definition, passes through the two links. Link capacities can be 
augmented  through  investments;  however,  once  capacity  is  chosen,  both  links  are 
potentially congestible. The distinction between the parallel network, analyzed in De 
Borger  et  al.  (2005),  and  the  serial  setting  considered  in  the  current  paper,  is 
illustrated on Figure 1.  
   Both  governments  are  assumed  to  maximise  a  local  welfare  function  that 
reflects two concerns, viz. (i) the travel conditions of its local users and the associated 
welfare, and (ii) total tax revenues on the link it controls. Transit traffic is supposed to 
have  its  origin  and  destination  outside  the  two-link  network,  so  that  the  two 
governments are not interested in the transport costs and the welfare of transit traffic
3.
Finally, we assume that all traffic flows are uniformly distributed over time and are 












Figure 1:  Parallel v ersus serial comp etition 
3 We could, for example, add local traffic originating in one of the countries that contributes to transit 
through the other country. This would imply a third category of traffic that reacts to the sum of the 
local toll and the transit toll abroad. This complicates matters but does not yield additional insights. 6
  Turning  to  the  specification  of  the  model,  demand  for  local  transport  in 
regions  A  and  B  is  represented  by  the  strictly  downward  sloping  and  twice 
differentiable inverse demand functions  ( )
Y
A A P Y  and  ( )
Y
B B P Y , respectively, where  A Y
and B Y  are the local flows on both links. As is common in the transport literature, 
prices (.)
j
i P   are  generalised  prices  including  resource  costs,  time  costs  and  tax 
payments or user charges. Similarly, overall demand for transit traffic is described by 
the strictly downward sloping inverse demand function ( )
X P X , where X is the transit 
traffic flow that passes through both regions A and B. 
  Turning to the cost side, the generalised user cost for transit, denoted as
X g ,
equals the sum of the time and resource costs of travel plus the transit tolls in both  A
and B:
( ) ( )
with 
X
A A A A B B B B
i i i
g C V R C V R
V X Y
W W  
 
In this expression, the  (.) i C  are the time plus resource costs on link i, and  i R  is the 
inverse  of  capacity
4. The  user  cost  function  is  twice  differentiable  and  strictly 
increasing in  i i VR , the total traffic volume relative to capacity. Making time costs a 
function of volume-capacity ratio is a common practice in transport economics
5. The 
transit tolls are denoted  i W . Similarly, the generalised user cost functions for local use 
of links A and B are given by, respectively: 
( )
Y
A A A A A g C V R t    .
( )
Y
B B B B B g C V R t    .
The i t  are the tolls on local transport. 
  Transport equilibrium for transit and local traffic implies 
( ) ( ) ( )
X X
A A A A B B B B P X g C V R C V R W W                         (1)
                                                
4 A trick we borrowed from de Palma and Leruth (1989). 
5 See Small (1992) for a discussion of the congestion functions for different modes. In the industrial 
organisation literature an  ŋshaped congestion function is used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to 
show that a 2 stage capacity and price game gives the same results as a one stage Cournot game in 
quantities. Our model does not fit into this category because of the different shape of the congestion 
function and because of the difference in objective functions of the agents.  7
  ( ) ( )
Y Y
A A A A A A A P Y g C V R t           (2) 
( ) ( )
Y Y
B B B B B B B P Y g C V R t           (3) 
2. Strategic transport pricing in a serial corridor
  In this section, we study the second stage of the tax-capacity game and focus 
on strategic pricing behaviour of the two governments, conditional on capacity levels. 
Here  the  methodology  closely  follows  De  Borger  et  al.  (2005).  Three  different 
assumptions  are  made  on  the  tolling  instruments  available:  we  consider  the  case 
where governments have access to differentiated tolls on local and transit traffic, we 
look at uniform tolls and, finally, we study the case where only local traffic can be 
tolled. In each case we first discuss the reduced-form demand system that expresses 
all demand functions as functions of the policy variables only. Next we derive the 
optimal tax rules for a given region. As the reaction functions and the resulting Nash 
equilibrium  in  taxes  are  rather  cumbersome  in  general,  we  finally  study  strategic 
behaviour using linear demand and user cost functions. Throughout this section we 
only report the main insights; technical details are provided in appendices.
2.1 Th e case of  dif f erentiated tolls
2 .1 .1 .  T h e   re d u c e d - f o rm  d e ma n d   s y s te m
  We start from the equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (3) given above. This 
system can easily be solved for the three transport volumes demanded as functions of 
the four tax rates and the two capacity levels: 
        ( , , , , , )
r
A B A B A B X X t t R R WW            
( , , , , , )
( , , , , , )
r
A A A B A B A B
r
B B A B A B A B
Y Y t t R R





These  reduced-form  demand  functions  are  an  interesting  short-cut  because  they 
already incorporate feedback effects of congestion on demand. This is the reason why 
any tax change of one of the governments affects all the transport flows, including 
local traffic flows abroad.  8
  Unless otherwise noted we limit our analysis to the domain where all flows are 
strictly  positive
6.  In  Appendix  1  we  show  that  the  demand  function  for  transit 
transport has the following properties:         
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A B A B
r r
A B











           (4)  
Expression (4) implies that higher transit taxes in an arbitrary region reduce overall 
transit demand and, as higher local taxes in any given region reduce congestion, they 
raise transit demand. Higher investment in capacity in either country raises transit 
demand.  
  Similarly, the reduced-form demand for local transport in region A has the 
following characteristics (again, see Appendix 1): 
                                 
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A A A A















      (5) 
This shows that transit taxes reduce transit demand and hence congestion, raising 
local demands, whereas local taxes reduce local demand.  Moreover, raising capacity 
abroad  in  B  attracts  more  transit,  increases  congestion  and,  as  a  consequence, 
decreases local traffic in A. Finally, a local capacity increase in A raises local traffic 
demand in this region.  
2.1.2. Op timal  tol l  rul es
  We focus on region A. Consider the problem of determining the tolls on local 
and transit traffic that maximizes local welfare, conditional on the existing capacities 









A A A A A A A A t
A
Max W P y dy g Y t Y X K
R W W   ³ .          (6)
                                                
6 This assumption is necessary to guarantee differentiable demand functions. 9
where A K is the constant unit rental cost of capacity
7, and the demand functions are the 
reduced-form demands just described. We show in Appendix 1 that the first-order 
conditions with respect to A t and A W imply the following tax rules: 
                   
' ' ( ) A A A A A A A t Y X C R L MEC XC R                           (7)















« » w « »  
ww « »
« » ww ¬ ¼
                                   (8)
where
'
A A A A L MEC Y C R   is the local marginal external cost and  ( , , ) A A A z X R t  stands 
for the (non reduced) demand function for local traffic. The local marginal external 
cost is the extra congestion cost imposed on local road users by one extra car on the 
link. These tax rules have the same structure as in the parallel network case (De 
Borger et al. (2005)) although, see below, they imply very different strategic tolling 
behaviour.  The  reduced-form  demand  derivatives  given  in  (7)-(8)  imply  that  both 
taxes exceed local marginal external cost. Moreover, in Appendix 1 we show that the 
transit tax exceeds the local tax. These results imply tax exporting (taxing transit at a 
higher  rate  than  local  demand)  and  tax  competition  (taxing  a  common  tax  base 
without any regard to the effects on the other regions revenue). The latter yields tolls 
on local traffic above marginal cost to reduce congestion and attract more transit.    
2.1.3 . Tax reaction functions for linear demand and cost functions 
  Note that (7)-(8) implicitly describe region As reaction functions: they give 
optimal taxes for given tax rates in B, at given capacity levels in both regions. To 
study  some  of  the  properties  of  these  reaction  functions  and  to  get  insight  into 
regions strategic behaviour, we simplify the analysis by assuming linear demand and 
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7 We assume constant returns to scale in capacity, an assumption more justified for road than for rail. 
We return to this assumption in our concluding section. 10
Cost functions for transport time (and resources) are specified as: 
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Note that demands and costs are linear in generalized prices and transport volumes, 
respectively. The cost function assumes that congestion is determined by the ratio of 
the  traffic  flow  relative  to  capacity  (remember  that  the ( , ) k R k A B   are  inverse 
capacities). The formulation in terms of the ȕ*  is convenient because at the pricing 
stage of the game we hold capacities constant. 
  In  Appendix  1  we  show  that  the  toll  reaction  functions  for  region  A  that 
follows from these specifications can be written as: 
1
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
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where the parameters  A c
W ,
t
A c , 1
B z and
A L  are all rather complex functions of demand 
and cost parameters. Note that  1
B z  (which is negative, see Appendix 1) gives the effect 
of an exogenous increase in transit transport in region B on the demand for local 
transport in that region. Moreover, we have  1 0
A L   .
  Interpretation of the signs of taxes in region B on optimal taxes in A is then 
clear. We find that an increase in the transit tax in B induces region A to optimally 
reduce both its transit tax and the tax on local traffic. The higher tax on transit in B 
reduces transit demand and hence reduces congestion in A. The optimal response in A 
is therefore to reduce both taxes. Similarly, a higher local tax in B induces region A to 
optimally raise transit as well as local taxes in A. The higher local tax in B reduces 
congestion in B, and attracts more transit. This also raises congestion in A. Therefore, 
country A raises its tax rates on all traffic on its territory.
  Note  that,  despite  the  very  different  setting,  the  structure  of  the  reaction 
functions  bears  some  close  resemblance  to  well-known  results  in  industrial 
organisation. For example, it implies that an increase in the transit toll in one region is 
partially compensated by a reduction in the transit toll imposed by the other region. 
More specifically, a one euro toll increase on transit in B induces region A to reduce 11
its toll by 0.5 euro, so that the overall transit toll for the whole trajectory rises by 0.5 
euro only. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the pricing behaviour of successive 
monopolies, where in the case of linear demands and costs a cost increase by one unit 
raises the final price by exactly 0.5 euro (see Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Tirole 
(1993)).
  Together  with  the  equivalent  expressions  for  B,  we  have  four  reaction 
functions  that  can  be  solved  for  the  Nash  equilibrium  in  taxes.  We  denote  this 
solution,  which  depends  on  the  capacity  levels,  as 
( , ), ( , ), ,
NE NE
k A B k A B R R t R R k A B W   .  Unfortunately,  despite  the  simplicity  of  the 
model (linear demands and costs), the expression that describes the partial effects of 
capacities on Nash equilibrium taxes are cumbersome, and even the signs of these 
derivatives  are  hard  to  determine  analytically.  Intuitively,  one  expects  a  capacity 
increases in A to reduce Nash equilibrium taxes in A, because of lower congestion 
(although it also implies extra revenue-raising capacity). A capacity increase in B 
raises congestion in A and is therefore likely to raise taxes in A. We expect, therefore: 
0, 0, 0, 0
NE NE NE NE
A A A A
A A B B
t t




Numerical analysis, see Section 4, confirms these signs. 
2.2. The case of uniform tolls
  The  procedure  to  derive  the  reduced-form  demand  system  is  entirely 
analogous to the differentiated tolling case; the only difference is that we set the local 
toll  ( , ) k t k A B   and the transit toll  ( , ) k k A B W   equal. We denote the uniform tolls 
by ( , ) k k A B T   . Derivations are summarized in Appendix 2. There we determine the 
following signs for the partial effects of the uniform taxes and capacity changes on 
transit demand  ( , , , )
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Both tax rates reduce transit demand. Capacity increases raise demand for transit. 
Similarly,  we  have  the  following  partial  effects  for  the  local  demand  function 
( , , , )
r
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A higher tax rate in A reduces local demand in A; an increase in the tax rate abroad 
reduces transit demand and, hence, raises local demand in A. Capacity increases in A 
(B) raise (reduce) local demand in A.    
  The optimal uniform tax can be written as, see Appendix 2.    












Noting the signs derived before, it follows that the tax rate exceeds the local marginal 
external cost. The difference positively depends on the importance of transit.
Finally, in the linear demand and cost case, the reaction function for region A 
can be written as (see Appendix 2): 
A
A A B c m
T T T  
where
A m < 0. This shows that the reaction function is downward sloping. A higher 
tax in B reduces transit demand through both regions, reducing congestion in A. This 
induces this region to reduce its uniform tax. 
  Nash  equilibrium  taxes  are  denoted  by  ( , )
NE
k A B R R T ,  , k A B   .  Again,  the 
derivatives  of  these  tax  expressions  with  respect  to  capacities  are  not  easily 








Higher capacity in A reduces congestion and hence one expects lower taxes. More 
capacity in B attracts more traffic to A and suggests higher taxes. Numerical analysis 
confirms this intuition; see Section 4.  13
2.3. The case of local tolls only
  The  case  of  local  tolls  only  is  analyzed  in  detail  in  Appendix  3.  The 
derivatives of the reduced-form demand functions with respect to the local tolls are 
identical to those for the differentiated tolling case. Indeed, the only difference is that 
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where, importantly, the term between square brackets is between zero and one. This 
implies that the optimal tax is positive but smaller than the local marginal external 
cost. Finally, in the linear demand and cost cases, reaction functions are found to be 
linear and downward sloping: a higher local tax in B reduces local demand but attracts 
more  transit,  which  passes  through  both  A  and  B.  Hence,  congestion  in  A  rises, 
reducing local traffic demand in A. This reduces the local marginal external cost so 
that country A reduces its tax rate on local demand. The intuition is that by doing so, 
country A raises local demand and thus congestion, which is the only way to reduce 
transit through its territory.  
  Note that in this case expectations on the partial effects of capacity changes on 
tolling behaviour are not obvious. More capacity in A attracts more transit, which 
remains un-tolled. To the extent that the capacity increase yields less congestion one 
expects the region to set a lower tax; this is confirmed in our numerical illustrations in 
section 4.14
 3. Strategic capacity choices: the first stage of the game
  In this section we study the capacity competition game, taking into account the 
implications of capacity choices for pricing behaviour derived in the previous section. 
Given the complexity of strategic capacity choices and its interaction with pricing at 
the second stage, the capacity game of this general case does not yield transparent 
theoretical  results.  To  get  some  preliminary  insights  on  the  nature  of  capacity 
interaction between the two links we therefore start out by briefly considering some 
special cases, viz. capacity competition in the absence of local traffic (subsection 3.1) 
and the case where tolls are not used at all (subsection 3.2). This second case allows 
us to exclusively focus on strategic capacity choices. Moreover, it is not uninteresting 
in its own right, because in some European countries within the EU, congestion tolls 
are  indeed  not  used  at  all.  The  general  case  where  both  tolls  and  capacities  are 
strategically  used  is  considered  in  subsection  3.3.  Throughout  we  focus  on  linear 
demands and costs.  
3.1. Capacity competition without local traffic
  Consider first the special case of zero local demand. Since transit welfare does 
not  enter  the  local  welfare  function  there  is  no  congestion  externality,  and  the 
objective  function  of  each  region  simply  consists  in  maximizing  the  transit  tax 
revenues minus capacity costs. It is easily shown that the pricing solution then boils 
down to the standard private duopoly result (Tirole (1993), Gibbons (1992)). We find 
that the only Nash equilibrium in tolls: (i) is symmetric, even if the free-flow cost 
parameters differ; (ii) is independent of capacities, and (iii) is independent of the slope 
of  the  congestion  function.  Moreover,  the  capacity  reaction  functions  are 
unambiguously positively sloped.  
3.2. Capacity competition when congestion tolls are not used
  If tolls are not used at all, the optimal capacity choice problem of the country 
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Using the definition of the generalized cost for the linear case, it can be written in 
implicit form as: 
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Expression (11) implicitly describes the reaction function in capacity for region A. In 
Appendix 4 we show that its slope is highly plausibly positive so that, when tolls are 
not  used  at  all,  capacities  in  the  two  regions  will  be  strategic  complements  The 
intuition is clear. Suppose region B raises capacity. This attracts more transit through 
both A and B so that, in order to dampen the negative welfare effect on local demand, 
country A reacts by also raising capacity. Of course, when tolls can be used as well, 
the increase in capacity also affects tolling behavior at the second stage, and our 
conjecture of positively sloped reaction functions may have to be amended. 
    
3.3. Tax-capacity competition: the general case
  The general case is complex due to the nonlinearities in the capacity reaction 
functions and the interaction with the pricing game. As an example, take the case of 
differentiated  tolling.  Optimal  capacity  at  the  first  stage  of  the  game  is  defined 
implicitly by the first order condition for a maximum of the local welfare function 
defined in (6), taking into account the dependency of optimal Nash equilibrium taxes 
at the second stage of the game on capacity.  
  The first-order condition of maximizing (6) with respect to inverse capacity in 
A can, using the equality between generalized price and cost, be written as: 
2
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Interpretation of (12) is conceptually simple. The right hand side reflects the capacity 
cost savings realised by a decrease in capacity. The left hand side gives the increase in 
user cost for local traffic (first term on the left hand side) and the change in tax 
revenues (other left hand side terms) caused by the decrease in capacity. Note that in 16
(12) all taxes are evaluated at their Nash equilibrium values, and the total derivatives 
capture direct capacity effects and indirect effects via tax adjustments:  
( )
Y r r NE
A A A
A A A
A A A A
dg dY dX t
V R
dR dR dR R
E
ªº w
 «» w ¬¼
, ,
NE NE r r r r
k k A A A A
k A B k A B A A k A k A
t dY Y Y Y
dR R t R R
W





NE NE r r r r
k k
k A B k A B A A k A k A
t dX X X X
dR R t R R
W




    
  The first-order condition (12) can be simplified by substituting the above total 
derivatives and using the first-order conditions for optimal taxation in region A. These 
could be written (see Appendix 1) 
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Using these results in (12), and noting the definition of the local marginal external 
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             (13) 
The  left  hand  side  captures  all  welfare  effects  of  demand  changes  induced  by 
capacity: the first term is the direct user cost increase of capacity changes at constant 
demand,  the  second  and  third  terms  represent  the  net  welfare  effects  via  induced 
demand changes. These terms are the product of the total demand change (direct and 
indirect via tax adjustments in the other region) and the deviation of taxes and local 
marginal  external  costs.  Observe  that  tax  adjustments  in  A  do  not  appear  in  this 
expression, because taxes in A have been determined optimally.  
  A special case is when no transit traffic exists. In that case the optimal local 
toll equals the local marginal congestion costs, and the left hand side of (13) reduces 
to the first term only: the direct costs of a reduction of capacity. We then obtain a first 
best result because there is no strategic interaction between both governments. 17
  Expression (13) implicitly describes the reaction function in capacities for the 
first  stage  of  the  game.  Unfortunately,  determining  the  sign  of  the  slope  of  this 
reaction  function  is  difficult  because  demands  and  Nash  equilibrium  taxes  are  all 
highly nonlinear in capacity. We did not attempt to do so, but will rely on numerical 
analysis below. The numerical results do confirm that capacity reaction functions are 
plausibly upward sloping in the general case as well. 
  For  completeness  sake,  consider  the  other  pricing  regimes.  In  the  case  of 
uniform taxes the first-order condition can be rewritten as (see Appendix 5): 
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         (14) 
Interpretation is as before. The first term represents the direct effect of increasing user 
costs for local traffic. The second term represents the induced losses of local and 
transit traffic multiplied by the net tax margin (Tax minus local marginal external 
costs).
  Finally, for local tolls only we can derive (see Appendix 5 for derivation) the 
following optimal capacity condition:   
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       (15) 
We again see a first term that represents direct user cost losses of a reduction of 
capacity. The second term represents the change in welfare of induced local traffic 
that does not pay its external congestion cost. The third term represents the gain in 
welfare  when  under-priced  transit  traffic  decreases  as  a  result  of  a  decrease  in 
capacity.18
4. A numerical illustration
  This section illustrates the results using numerical simulation analysis. We 
first explain the calibration of the no toll reference equilibrium for the symmetric case 
with identical regions (subsection 4.1). Next we discuss the outcomes of the first stage 
of  the  game,  i.e.,  the  Nash  equilibrium  tolls  for  given  capacities  under  the  three 
different pricing regimes (subsection 4.2). Then the results of the complete two-stage 
pricing and capacity game are considered (subsection 4.3). Moreover, the importance 
of transit and of the slope of the congestion function for the results is highlighted. 
Finally, we conclude this section by discussing the role of the relative size of the two 
countries (subsection 4.4). 
4.1 Calibration of the reference case
  Assume initially that the two regions are ex ante symmetric. Moreover, the no 
toll reference case is constructed such that local and transit demand each account for 
50% of total traffic in a given region. Local and transit demand each amount to 1300 
trips  per  time  unit.  Capacity  was  set  at  2000  in  each  region;  which  implies  the 
reference value for inverse capacities  0.0005 A B R R    
8.
The zero toll equilibrium was used as the reference situation to calibrate the 
parameters of the model. In other words, all parameters (demand function parameters, 
slope of the congestion function, the capacity cost, etc.) were calibrated so that the 
parameters reproduced the zero toll Nash equilibrium consistent with the transport 
volumes  and  capacities  assumed.  The  set  of  parameters  that  resulted  from  the 
calibration procedure is reproduced in Appendix 6.
4.2. Optimal pricing at given capacities: the pricing stage of the game
  In  Table  1  we  report  results  for  the  pricing  game  at  fixed  capacities.  We 
consecutively  report  5  different  equilibria:  the  no  toll  situation  to  which  the 
parameters  were  calibrated,  three  Nash  equilibrium  outcomes  (differentiated  tolls, 
8 Note that these  capacity levels are chosen so that, in the absence of tolling, they reflect the optimal 
values for each of the countries, given the cost of capacity. This will become important when we 
endogenize the choice of capacity. 19
uniform tolls, local toll only) and the centralized solution. The centralized solution 
reflects  the  optimal  policies  when  the  two-link  serial  transport  corridor  would  be 
operated by one welfare maximizing government.     
  Results indicate the following. First, the equilibrium with tax differentiation 
yields  very  high  taxes  on  transit;  this  follows  from  the  fact  that  transit  yields  no 
benefits except tax revenues to the individual regions. The consequence is a drastic 
reduction in transit transport. Welfare of the individual countries rises substantially: 
despite the toll on local transport the generalized cost of local transport only increases 
slightly; this is due to the lower time cost associated with much lower transit demand. 
Of course, the welfare increase in the two countries is due to the fact that the welfare 
of transit traffic is not incorporated into the countries individual welfare functions. 
Incorporating the reduction in welfare for transit, which is almost wiped out, implies 
that total welfare declines compared to no tolls at all. Second, in the case of uniform 
taxes we observe taxes substantially exceeding local marginal external costs, yielding 
a reduction in countries individual welfare compared to the tax differentiation case. 
Third, if only local tolls are optimized we see, consistent with the prediction from the 
theoretical  sections,  taxes  that  are  (slightly)  below  local  marginal  external  cost. 
Interestingly, in this case not only is the countries individual welfare higher than in 
the  reference  case,  but  even  accounting  for  transit  welfare  this  solution  improves 
overall  welfare.  Transit  is  obviously  better  off  because  it  is  not  tolled  and  local 
transport is, reducing congestion. Finally, the centralized optimal solution yields a 
uniform toll of about 30% the level at the uniform toll Nash equilibrium; it leads to 
higher regional welfare as well as overall welfare.  
  Of course, the results are highly sensitive to the importance of transit in the 
initial equilibrium. Calibrating the model for a 10% share of transit in the reference 
situation, we find that all symmetric Nash equilibria, except the differentiated tolling 
case, improve overall welfare. Moreover, uniform tolls are much lower than before.   Variable  Unit  No tolls 
Nash
Equilibrium







Centralised -  
dif f erentiation
Local demand  Trips  1300 1249  758 1221 1156
Transit demand  Trips  1300 407  758 1305 1156
Trip v olume,  country  level  Trips  2600 1657  1516 2526 2312
Generalised price,  local  Euro/ Trip  65. 4 74. 0  156. 3 78. 7 89. 6
Generalised price,  transit  Euro/ Trip  130. 9 430. 4  312. 7 129. 1 179. 3
Local Toll  Euro/ Trip  0. 0 19. 8  103. 9 14. 1 27. 7
Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 161.1  103.9 0.0 27.7
Local MEC  Euro/Trip  15.6 14.9  9.1 14.6 13.8
Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31.1 19.8  18.1 30.2 27.7
Local CS  1000 Euro  142 131  48 125 112
Tax rev enue,  country  level  1000 Euro  0 90  158 17 64
Welf are,  country  level  1000 Euro  142 221  206 142 176
Transit welf are ( CS)   1000 Euro  284 28  96 286 224
Ov erall welf are  1000 Euro  567 470  508 571 576
Change compared to Non toll  %  0 - 17.07  - 10.45 0.59 1.57
Table 1: Results of symmetric  pricing game for fix ed  capacity of 2 0 0 0  calibrated  with  5 0 %  transit traffic in no toll eq uilibrium ( welfare figures d o not includ e 
capacity costs;  th ey are constant for all scenarios)  4.3. Strategic capacity choices and pricing 
In this subsection we turn to the complete capacity-pricing game. First we 
illustrate the impact of  capacity changes on optimal tolling behav iour;  nex t we d iscuss 
the results of  the f ull solution to the two-stage game. 
4.3.1. Exogenous capacity adjustments and optimal tolling behaviour
  Note that in the theoretical sections it prov ed  d if f icult to prod uce clear-cut 
analytical  results  f or  the  signs  of   the  partial  d eriv ativ es  of   tax es  with  respect  to 
capacities:





























We  theref ore  f irst  illustrate  the  ef f ect  of   increasing  capacity  on  Nash  eq uilibrium 
tax es. Giv en f ix ed  inv erse capacities, RA andRB, and  assuming linear d emand  and  cost 
curv es,  we  can  solv e  the  pricing  game  analytically  to  d etermine  the  v ariables 
, , , , , A B A B A X Y Y t t W  and   B W  as f unctions of  the inv erse capacities.  This has been d one 
f or the three tax  regimes:  d if f erentiated  tolls, unif orm tolls and  local tolls only. We 
can then ev aluate these ex pressions f or v arious v alues of  capacity in a giv en region, 
say  A,  hold ing  all  other  v ariables  and   parameters  constant.  In  all  other  respects 
countries A and  B are treated  as id entical.
  We summariz e the results in Figure 2 , where we concentrate on two cases:  
unif orm tolls and  local tolls only. Consid er the unif orm tolling case. The f igure shows 
the ef f ect of  capacity changes in country A on the optimal unif orm tax es of  both 
regions. In the initial situation where the capacities in A and  B are id entical we hav e a 
Nash eq uilibrium with unif orm tolls eq ual to 1 0 4  in both regions. Halv ing capacity in 
A increases the unif orm toll in A but f orces B to red uce its toll slightly. The elasticity 
of  the Nash tolls with respect to a capacity change in A is in absolute terms twice as 
large f or the toll in A than f or the toll in B. This reaction is conf irmed  if  we cut 
capacity by half  once more and  arriv e at tolls of  1 2 4  in A and  9 1  in B. The ex ogenous 
lowering of  capacity in A increases the local marginal ex ternal congestion cost and  
this is an important ingred ient of  the optimal unif orm tax  in A. Country B now f aces a 
transit  d emand   with  a  lower  resid ual  willingness  to  pay  and   is  f orced   to  cut  its 
unif orm  tolls  in  ord er  to  protect  its  rev enues.  With  the  ex ogenous  d ecrease  in 22
transport capacity in A, transit demand will decrease, local demand in country A will 
contract strongly while local demand in country B will expand as a result of less 
transit. The same profile of reactions can be found in the differentiated tolling case 
(not shown on Figure 2): an exogenous reduction of capacity in A will increase the 
local tax and transit tax at home and will decrease the local and transit tax in B.  
When only local demand can be tolled, an exogenous reduction of capacity in 
A  will  reduce  the  local  toll  in  A  (see  Figure  2,  lower  left  corner).  An  important 
difference  with  the  uniform  case  is  that  the  tax  on  local  traffic  in  B  now  stays 
approximately constant. This can be explained by the fact that the risk  of increasing 
congestion caused by higher transit traffic, due to capacity reductions and increased 
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Figure 2: Shifts in Nash equilibria for uniform tolls and differentiated tolls as a 
result of exogenous changes in the transport capacity in A. 
4.3.2. Strategic tolling and capacity choices on a transport corridor
  S ome results for the complete two-stage game are summarized in Table 2. 
First,  consider  the  implications  of  the  different  pricing  regimes  for  the  optimal 
capacity choice in equilibrium. We observe that, compared to the no-toll capacity of 
2000, optimal capacities decline for all three tolling regimes. This is not surprising. 
The no-toll equilibrium was calibrated such that the observed capacity was optimal in 23
the Nash equilibrium, and the use of tolls reduces overall transport demand in each 
country. One therefore expects that capacity is lower than when no tolls are charged. 
Note  that  the  capacity  reduction  strongly  differs  with  the  tolling  regime  in  place. 
Optimal capacity is smallest when regions compete on the basis of uniform tolls; in 
that case high uniform tolls to tackle congestion lead to strong reductions in demand 
and, hence, low capacities. The optimal capacity is much larger when regions only use 
local  tolls.  In  that  case  high  transit  demand  implies  a  relatively  small  demand 
reduction compared to the no-toll equilibrium; capacity is much higher than with tolls 
on transit as a consequence. The case of differentiated tolls takes up an intermediate 
position: capacity is somewhat higher than in the uniform toll case. Transit demand is 
low, but local demand is much higher than with uniform tolls.    
  Second,  note  that  the  optimal  tolls  on  local  transport  are,  for  all  tolling 
regimes, higher than in the case capacity could not be optimally chosen. This is not 
surprising, because we showed in the previous subsection that capacity reductions at 
the first stage of the game induce regions to raise tolls on local transport at the second 
stage.  Capacity  reductions  raise  congestion,  giving  rise  to  higher  taxes  on  local 
demand. The optimal toll on transit slightly declines in comparison with the case of 
fixed capacity. It is the j oint effect of capacity expansions in the own region and in the 
competing region.       
  In Table 1, we have seen that, when transit is sufficiently important, allowing 
individual countries to toll actually reduces overall welfare, except for the case where 
countries can only toll local traffic. The intuition for this result is clear: a country will 
only toll its home traffic if its local consumer surplus plus tax revenue on locals 
increases,  and  any  tax  increase  on  local  traffic  benefits  transit  through  lower 
congestion. So for the case of local tolls only, toll incentives are compatible with 
overall welfare. Interestingly, in Table 2 we see that this result still holds when we 
include capacity choice. In all cases, when tolling is introduced, it becomes interesting 
to  reduce  the  overall  capacity  level,  which  will  affect  transit  welfare  negatively. 
However, for the case of local tolls only, this does not outweigh the benefit received 
from tolling local traffic.  
  Finally, note that we have only considered the case where transit and local 
demand make up 5 0% each of total transport in a given region. It is clear that tolling 
behaviour and capacity choices may be substantially affected by assuming different 
shares  of  transit.  A  share  of  only  10%  transit  in  the  no  toll  Nash  equilibrium  is 24
analysed in Table 3; the two regions are still assumed to be symmetric. This case has 
the  same  total  demand  function,  the  same  congestion  function  and  the  same  unit 
capacity cost as the previous 50%-50% case discussed in Table 2.   
  Results from comparing Tables 2 and 3 are as follows. The optimal uniform 
tolls in the 10% transit case are substantially lower than in the 50%-50% case, despite 
the increase in local marginal external cost. This follows from the decreased tendency 
for tax exporting behaviour. In the case of local tolls only, the Nash equilibrium local 
toll in Table 3 is higher than in Table 2, and it hardly differs from the (higher) local 
marginal external cost; this again reflects the lower importance of transit. Relative 
capacity reductions in the differentiated and uniform tolling cases are also slightly 
smaller in the case with low transit shares. This is due to the fact that the benefits of 
capacity provision are enjoyed to a larger extent by local traffic. Finally, note that the 
centralized solution in the 10% transit case yields the same optimal tolls and capacity 
levels  as  in  the  50%-50%  case  considered  in  Table  2;  this  follows  from  our 
assumption of identical total demand and congestion functions.  
We further also checked the sensitivity of the symmetric results by increasing 
the slope of the congestion function (ȕ) by 20%. We found (these results are not 
shown) that this implies higher optimal capacities, higher tolls and lower volumes; 
moreover, and that it does not alter the welfare ranking of the five capacity-price 












Local demand  Trips  1300 1219 732 1215 1233
Transit demand  Trips  1300 396 732 1301 1233
Trip volume, country level  Trips  2600 1616 1465 2516 2467
Generalised price, local  Euro/Trip  65.4 79.0 160.7 79.7 76.6
Generalised price, transit  Euro/Trip  130.9 434.1 321.3 130.6 153.3
Time cost   Euro/Trip  32.7 23.9 23.3 32.6 22.8
inverse capacity  1/trips  0.00050 0.00058 0.00062 0.00051 0.00036
Capacity  Trips  2000 1732 1618 1945 2791
capacity relative to reference     1.00 0.87 0.81 0.97 1.40
volume/capacity ratio     1.30 0.93 0.91 1.29 0.88
Local Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 22.3 104.7 14.4 21.1
Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 160.4 104.7 0.0 21.1
Local MEC  Euro/Trip  15.6 16.8 10.8 14.9 10.6
Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31.1 22.3 21.7 31.0 21.1
Local CS  Euro  141779 124726 45011 123815 127602
Tax revenue, country level  Euro  0 90793 153333 17536 52160
Cost of capacity   Euro?  37383 32371 30251 36346 52160
Welfare, country level  Euro  104395 183147 168093 105005 127602
Transit welfare (CS)  Euro  283557 26363 90023 283945 255204
Overall welfare  Euro  492348 392658 426209 493956 510409
Share country A  20,22 21.20 46.64 39.44 21.26
Change compared to Non toll  %  0 -20.25 -13.43 0.33 3.67
Change compared to Centraliz ed- different. %  -3.54 -23.07 -16.50 -3.22 0.00
Table 2: Results of symmetric two-stage capacity and pricing game with 50% transit in no toll equilibrium  26












Local demand  Trips  2334 2216 2008 2219 2220
Transit demand  Trips  259 82 223 270 247
Trip volume, country level  Trips  2593 2297 2232 2489 2467
Generalised price, local  Euro/Trip  66.0 77.0 96.3 76.7 76.6
Generalised price, transit  Euro/Trip  132.0 429.9 192.7 113.6 153.3
Time cost   Euro/Trip  32.7 22.4 22.2 23.5 22.2
inverse capacity  1/trips  0.00051 0.00039 0.00040 0.00038 0.00036
Capacity  Trips  1958 2575 2524 2653 2791
capacity relative to reference     1.00 1.32 1.29 1.35 1.43
volume/capacity ratio     1.32 0.89 0.88 0.94 0.88
Local Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 21.35 40.9 19.9 21.1
Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 159.26 40.9 0.0 21.1
Local MEC  Euro/Trip  28.5 20.6 19.0 20.0 19.0
Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31.7 21.3 21.2 22.5 21.1
Local CS  Euro  253831 228794 187994 229530 229684
Tax revenue, country level  Euro  0 60323 91185 44182 52160
Cost of capacity   Euro?  36593 48126 47180 49580 52160
Welfare, country level  Euro  217238 240991 231999 224132 229684
Transit welfare (CS)  Euro  56407 5611 41776 61297 51041
Overall welfare  Euro  490883 487594 505774 509561 510409
Share country A  44.25 44.25 49.42 45.87 43.99
Change compared to Non toll  %  0 -0.67 3.03 3.80 3.98
Change compared to Centralized-different. %  -3.83 -4.47 -0.91 -0.17 0.00
Table 3: Results of symmetric two-stage capacity and pricing game with 10% transit in no toll equilibrium  27
4.4 Role of relative country size
  In this subsection we illustrate the role of asymmetries in country size. It is 
well known in the tax competition literature (see Kanbur and Keen (1993)) that, in a 
cross border context, the small country has a larger incentive to undercut the tax rate 
of its neighbour. This typically holds for cigarettes or gasoline. The intuition is that 
the  big  country  loses  more  revenue  by  lowering  taxes  because  it  can  never  gain 
abroad what it loses at home. Our context is different in two respects. Firstly, the 
country  governments  we  analyze  are  by  assumption  maximizers  of  local  welfare 
rather than pure revenue maximizers. Secondly, the transit tax base is the same for 
both countries and does not shift from one country to another like the demand for 
sigarettes would do. 
  In Tables 4 and 5 we report the results of the capacity and price competition 
for the case where a corridor runs through two different countries. The first one is a 
 small  country where, in the absence of tolling,  transit is as important as local traffic 
(similar  to our 50%  transit case of Table 2); the second country is a  large  country 
where, in the absence of tolling, transit is only 10% of total traffic (similar to the 90%, 
10% case of Table 3). Because the transit traffic is the same in the small and the large 
country, the large country has a higher total demand than the small country. As the 
cost of capacity is kept constant, the slope of the congestion function in the large 
country  has  been  increased  to  have  the  same  generalised  cost  in  the  no  toll 
equilibrium.  
  The behaviour of both countries depends now strongly on the type of tolling 
instrument that is available. We see that in the Nash differentiated toll case, both 
countries charge high tolls on transit and we have the same double marginalisation 
problem  as  in  the  symmetric  case.  When  only  uniform  tolls  are  available,  the 
behaviour of the small and large country are very different. The small country A now 
has an interest to favour the revenue motive and accept inefficient pricing for its local 
users, while the large country gives much higher weight to the local users. In the local 
tolls only case, we have again fairly similar results for both countries. In terms of 
overall welfare (small +  large country), the ranking of the solutions is similar to the 
symmetric case. Worst is the tax discrimination case, followed by the uniform case, 
the no toll case and the local tolls only case. It is interesting to note that the small 28
country can spoil the welfare gains the large country could generate with a uniform 
tax. In the symmetric 10% transit case, shown in Table 3, the uniform solution was 
better than the no tolling case. This is no longer true here because the small country 












Local demand  Trips  1300 1209 654 1207 1231
Transit demand  Trips  1300 383 849 1297 1182
Trip volume, country level  Trips  2600 1592 1504 2504 2413
Generalised price, local  Euro/Trip  65.4 80.7 173.7 80.9 77.0
Generalised price, transit  Euro/Trip  130.9 438.4 282.0 131.9 170.4
Time cost   Euro/Trip  32.8 24.8 23.7 33.5 22.9
inverse capacity    0.00046 0.00056 0.00057 0.00049 0.00034
Capacity  Trips  2161 1774 1758 2032 2926
capacity relative to reference     1.00 0.82 0.81 0.94 1.35
volume capacity ratio     1.20 0.90 0.86 1.23 0.82
Local Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 23.2 117.2 14.8 21.4
Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 152.6 117.2 0.0 21.4
Local MEC  Euro/Trip  15.5 17.6 9.6 15.3 10.9
Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31.1 23.2 22.1 31.8 21.3
Local CS  Euro  141676 122563 35907 122239 126967
Tax revenue, country level  Euro  0 86422 176290 17846 51680
Cost of capacity   Euro?  40384 33168 32859 37988 54684
Welfare, country level  Euro  101292 175817 179338 102097 123963
Transit welfare (CS)  Euro  283353 24593 120923 281987 234275
Overall welfare  Euro  1296275 1221876 1276962 1317004 1328312
Share country A     7.81 14.39 14.04 7.75 9.33
Share country B     70.33 83.60 76.49 70.84 73.03
Change compared to Non toll  %  0 -5.74 -1.49 1.60 2.47
Change compared to Centralized-different. %  -2.41 -8.01 -3.87 -0.85 0.00
Table 4: Results of asymmetric two-stage capacity and pricing game for (small) country A and overall results for A and B 30












Local demand  Trips  11700 10125 9395 10197 10200
Transit demand  Trips  1300 383 849 1297 1182
Trip volume, country level  Trips  13000 10508 10245 11494 11382
Generalised price, local  Euro/Trip  65.4 94.8 108.3 93.4 93.3
Generalised price, transit  Euro/Trip  130.9 438.4 282.0 131.9 170.4
Time cost   Euro/Trip  32.8 31.9 31.1 33.1 31.2
inverse capacity  1/trips  0.00005 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006
Capacity  Trips  19445 16163 16141 17003 17915
Capacity relative to reference     1.00 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.92
volume capacity ratio     0.67 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64
Local Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 30.2 44.5 27.6 29.5
Transit Toll  Euro/Trip  0.0 163.8 44.5 0.0 29.5
Local MEC  Euro/Trip  28.0 29.1 27.0 27.9 26.5
Global MEC  Euro/Trip  31.1 30.2 29.5 31.4 29.5
Local CS  Euro  1275088 955015 822393 968783 969334
Tax revenue, country level  Euro  0 368564 456009 281956 335609
Cost of capacity   Euro?  363458 302114 301701 317819 334869
Welfare, country level  Euro  911630 1021466 976701 932920 970074
Table 5: Results of asymmetric two-stage capacity and pricing game for (large) country B 315. Summary and caveats
  In this paper we have analyzed the strategic behaviour of country governments 
that each operate one individual link of a congested transport corridor. We studied a 
two stage game in capacities and prices under three different pricing regimes.  
  The  conclusions  are  easily  summarized.  With  respect  to  optimal  tolling 
behavior we showed that, when transit can be tolled, strategic behavior implies that a 
unit increase in the transit toll in one region raises the total toll on transit users for the 
whole trajectory by less than one unit. Moreover, transit tolls are inefficiently high. 
However, if only local traffic can be tolled, Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently 
low: tolls are shown to be smaller than the marginal external congestion cost imposed 
on local traffic. The reason is that higher local tolls would attract too much transit 
traffic and hence reduce welfare.  
  At  the  capacity  stage  of  the  game,  we  showed  that  capacities  in  the  two 
regions  are  likely  to  be  strategic  complements:  reaction  functions  are  plausibly 
upward sloping so that higher capacity on one link of the corridor induces the operator 
of the other link to invest in capacity as well. Moreover, we find that capacity changes 
strongly affect optimal tolling behavior. Higher capacity investment in a region not 
only lowers optimal tolls in this region under all pricing regimes, but it also affects 
tolls on transit in the other region. We further find interesting interactions between 
optimal  capacities  and  the  pricing  instruments  used:  optimal  capacity  with 
differentiated tolls is higher than in the case of uniform tolls; the largest optimal 
capacity results when only local tolls are used. Finally, we emphasized the role of the 
share of transit and of asymmetric country sizes for the results.       
Although the analysis was based on a very simple model, it may have potential 
applicability in a number of cases where capacity and pricing decisions in regions are 
strategically  chosen.  This  includes  investment  and  pricing  on  Trans  European 
Networks (basically a border-crossing highway system) in Europe and the interstate 
highway system in the US. Moreover, it is equally relevant for pricing and investment 
decisions  for  long  distance  rail  trips,  and  with  minor  adaptation  the  analysis  also 
applies to inter-modal freight trips where the transfer facility (ports, airports, freight 
terminal) and the upstream or downstream infrastructure is controlled by different 
governments. 33
  Several avenues for extension could be considered. One is to generalise the 
results for transport corridors through n (rather than just 2) countries. Another is to 
explore the implications of relaxing the assumption of constant returns in capacity 
expansion. A third extension could be to integrate the results for serial networks with 
those obtained for parallel networks. A fourth extension would be to pay specific 
attention to the timing of the game with, say, one country leading in the capacity 
extension. A further extension would be to examine a cooperative process. Finally, 
one could examine other assumptions on the behaviour of the countries  decision 
makers  and  explicitly  develop  some  of  the  political  economy  aspects  of  tax  and 
capacity decisions.
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Appendix 1: The case of differentiated tolls
In this appendix we derive the most relevant results for the differentiated tolling case. 
The procedure is the same as in De Borger et al (2005) but requires some adjustment 
for the particular serial setting considered here.
Characteristics of the reduced-form demands
  We start from the equilibrium conditions: 
                 ( ) ( ) ( )
X
A A A A B B B B P X C V R C V R W W             (A1.1)                     
  ( ) ( )
Y
A A A A A A P Y C V R t               (A1.2)                               
  ( ) ( )
Y
B B B B B B P Y C V R t               (A1.3)  
Noting that  k A V Y X   , first solve the two last equations for local transport as a 
function of transit demand, the local tax rate and capacity in a given region: 
        ( , , ) A A A A Y z X R t                                  (A1.4)
                 ( , , ) B B B B Y z X R t                     (A1.5) 































































  An analogous result is derived for B. Interpretation is simple: an exogenous 
increase in transit reduces the demand for local transport, as it raises local congestion 
and hence generalised user cost.  Raising the local tax, at a given transit level, reduces 
local demand for transport. Finally, increasing capacity (decreasing R), increases the 
local transport flow. 





















         (A1.9) 
Moreover, substituting (A1.4)-(A1.5) into (A1.1) yields: 
> @ > @ ( ) ( ( , )), ( ( , )),
X
A A A A A B B B B B P X C X z X t R C X z X t R W W  
                                                          
Solution of this expression for transit demand X yields the reduced form demand for 
transit as a function of all four tax rates. Using the implicit function theorem we 
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we  then  also  easily  show  that  the  effects  of  taxes  and  capacity  on  reduced  form 
demand are: 
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A B A B
r r
A B











       (A1.16)  










  Finally, to determine the impact of taxes and capacities on local demands, we 
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Substituting previous results, it follows after simple algebra: 
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A A A A















      (A1.17) 
Optimal taxes
  We  focus  on  region  A.  Consider  the  problem  of  determining  the  welfare 
optimal taxes on local and transit transport, conditional on the existing capacities in 









A A A A A A A A t
A
Max W P y dy g Y t Y X K
R W W   ³ .
where A K is the unit rental cost of capacity, and the demand functions are the reduced 
form demands just described. The first-order condition with respect to the local tax 
rate can be written as:               
0
r r Y r r
Y Y A A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
Y Y g Y X
P g Y t Y





Differentiating                   
        ( ) ( )
Y Y
A A A A A A A P Y g C V R t    
and using equality of generalized price and generalized cost in equilibrium allows us 
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A similar procedure is used to show that the first-order condition with respect to 
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                To determine the optimal taxes, we write the system in matrix notation and 
solve  by  Cramers  rule.  We  find,  using  similar  manipulations  as  described  in  De 
Borger et al. (2005), the following tax rule for local traffic and transit, respectively: 
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where
'
A A A A L MEC Y C R   is the local marginal external cost. 
  To show that the transit tax exceeds the local tax subtract the two taxes, use 
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Tax reaction functions: The case of linear demands and costs
  We report results for country A; all results for B are derived analogously. 
Using linear specifications , the demand for local transport in A conditional on transit 
demand and the local tax is given by: 
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A A A
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Substituting these functions in the equilibrium condition for transit yields:                                 
0 1 1 1 1 1 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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  The first order conditions for optimal local and transit taxes for country A can 
be written as:   
' * ( ) ( ) A A A A A A t Y X C R Y X E   
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Substituting for transit demand X, using the definitions of the various parameters and 
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Note that simple algebra shows that  1 0
A L   .
  Existence of equilibrium in prices follows as in De Borger et al (2005).  
Appendix 2: The uniform tolling case
Reduced-form demands
Going through exactly the same derivations as before we easily derive:
   ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )
X
A A A A A A B B B B B B P X C X z X R R C X z X R R T TTT ªºªº   ¬¼¬¼
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain the partial effects of the uniform taxes 
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The first-order condition to the problem 41
0





A A A A A A
A
K
Max W P y dy g Y Y X
R T T   ³ ,
can be written as: 
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To simplify, use: 
> @ ( ) ( )
Y Y
A A A A A A A P Y g C X Y R T    ,
differentiate with respect to  A T and substitute to obtain: 
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Solving for the tax yields: 












Noting the signs derived before, it follows that the tax rate exceeds the local marginal 
external cost.
Tax reaction function: linear demand and cost
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where
































Uniform tax increases reduce transit demand.      
  The optimal tax rule for A is given by:  42
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; coefficients for 
B are defined analogously. The sign of the slopes of the reaction functions can be 
shown to be negative. Indeed, using the definitions of  A K  and  A J , and substituting for 
' in the resulting expressions, the numerator of 
A m can be shown to be negative, the 
denominator positive. This shows that the reaction function is downward sloping.  
Appendix 3: The case of local tolls only
Optimal tax rule
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Importantly, the term between square brackets can be shown to be between zero and 









. To see that the 43
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as follows:  
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The implication is economically important. It implies that the optimal tax is positive 
but smaller than the local marginal external cost. 
Tax reaction functions: linear demands and costs
Finally, in the case of local taxes only, we have that the demand for transit only 
depends on the two local taxes; the coefficients are the same as those defined for the 































Note that  0 1 A s  . Substituting the reduced form demand for local transport and 
working out leads to the following reaction function for country As optimal local tax 
as a function of the local tax in B: 
t





































Since the numerator of the slope coefficient is negative and the denominator positive, 
it follows that the slope of the reaction function is negative.44
Appendix 4. Capacity competition in the absence of tolling
  For the simplified case of zero taxes, the optimal capacity choice problem 
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    (A4.1) 
  We  are  interested  in  the  reaction  function  in  capacities,  i.e.,  the  optimal 
capacity in A, conditional on capacity in B. Expression (A4.1) implicitly defines this 
reaction function, which we denote  ( )
R
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In the remainder of this appendix we focus on the linear demand and cost case. Then 
we have: 
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The final term between brackets is given by:          
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           (A4.3) 
Note that this expression, by the first order condition (A4.2), must be positive: a 
capacity reduction in A raises travel cost. Substituting (A4.3) in (A4.2) leads to: 
1 2 ( , ) (1 ) 0
r
A A
A B A A A A
A A
K X
R R Y z V R
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      (A4.4)45

















                 (A4.5) 
where  the  denominator  is  negative  by  the  second  order  condition  of  the  optimal 
capacity choice problem. The sign of (A4.5) therefore depends on the numerator only. 
To determine its sign, differentiate (A4.4) with respect to inverse capacity in B: 
2
1 1 (1 ) (1 )( )
r r r
r A A A A
A A A A A A
B B A B A B
V Y X X
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        (A4.6) 
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we have
2












­ ½ w w' ª º ' ° ° « » ww w ° ° « »  ® ¾
ww' « » ° °
« » ° ° ¬ ¼ ¯¿
.






































  «» w'w ¬¼
ªº w'
 «» 'w ¬¼
ªº w w
 «» w w ¬¼
                  (A4.8) 
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Third, we further easily show, see (7): 
1 (1 ) 0
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A A
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< 0                               (A4.13) 
  Substituting (A4.9), (A4.11), (A4.12) and (A4.13) in (A4.8), and using the 
definition of total demand,  A A V Y X   , then gives after simple manipulation: 





(1 ) (1 ) (1 2 )
(1 ) ( )
(1 )
r
A A r A A
A A A A
B B
A
r A A B B
A A A A
B B B
X
z R z Y z Xz
R R
z d







ww ªºªº  ' ¬¼¬¼ w'w
ª º 
 « » ' ¬ ¼
                     (A4.14) 
This expression consists of two terms. The second is positive, the first is ambiguous. 









the first term will also be positive provided  
1 1 (1 2 )
r A A
A Y z Xz  < 0.             (A4.15) 
This will be the case if transit is relatively important and the impact of transit on local 
demand ( 1 0
A z  ) is sufficiently large in absolute value.   
  Note that it is quite plausible that (A4.15) is satisfied; a sufficient condition is 
that ( 1 0.5
A z ! , or alternatively, that  A A A d R E  . The left hand side is the slope of the 
local  inverse  demand  function,  the  right  hand  side  is  the  slope  of  the  congestion 
function at given capacity. A sufficient (but by no means necessary) condition is, 
therefore, a sufficiently sloped congestion function.47
  The  implication  is  that  capacities  in  the  two  regions  will  be  strategic 
complements  (i.e.,  capacity  reaction  functions  are  upward  sloping)  if  transit  is 
sufficiently important, that is, if transit demand is non-negligible and if more transit 
appreciably reduces local demand through congestion effects. The intuition is clear. 
Suppose region B raises capacity. This attracts more transit through both A and B so 
that, in order to dampen the negative welfare effect on local demand, country A reacts 
by also raising capacity.  
  Note, however, that when transit is rather unimportant and if it does not much 
affect local demand then the reaction functions may in principle be negatively sloped. 
In  that  case,  higher  capacity  in  B  induces  A  to  reduce  capacity:  more  transit  is 
attracted through both regions by the capacity increase in B, but this hardly affects 
local demand in A so that, given the cost of capacity expansion, it is not worthwhile to 
expand capacity. In fact, capacity is reduced if the welfare loss due to slightly more 
congestion is more than compensated by the marginal capacity cost savings. 
Appendix 5: The optimal capacity choice rule for the cases of uniform taxes and 
local taxes only
In the case of uniform taxes the first-order condition can be rewritten as: 
2 ( ) ( )
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Interpretation  is  as  before.  The  first  order  condition  equates  marginal  costs  and 
benefits of capacity expansion, where the indirect effects via tax adjustment are taken 
into account. Substituting the total derivatives and using the first-order condition for 
optimal tax setting by region A, the optimal capacity choice rule can be reformulated 
as :48
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  Finally, for the case of local tolls only we have: 
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This can be rewritten as, using the optimal tax condition for region A, as: 
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Appendix 6: Calibration of parameters for numerical example
Remember  that  the  parameters  , , , a b c d describe  the  demand  for  local  and  transit 
transport,  and  , D E determine  the  congestion  function.  Moreover, 
* 0.0005* R E EE    , and K is the cost of capacity. All parameters are the same in A 









Table A6.1. Calibration constants (identical for regions A and B) The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division 
of the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
L eu ven.   T he  C ES   research  d epartment  employ s  some  1 0 0  
people.   T he  d ivision  Energ y ,   T ransport  &   Environment  ( ET E)  
cu rrently  consists of ab ou t 1 5  fu ll time researchers.  T he g eneral 
aim  of  ET E  is  to  apply   state  of  the  art  economic  theory   to 
cu rrent  policy   issu es  at  the  F lemish,   B elg ian  and   Eu ropean 
level.   A n  important  asset  of  ET E  is  its  ex tensive  portfolio  of 
nu merical  partial  and   g eneral  eq u ilib riu m  mod els  for  the 
assessment of transport,  energ y  and  environmental policies.  
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2 0 0 6
N ° 2 0 0 6 - 0 2   De B org er B . ,  Du nkerley  F .  A nd  P roost S .  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  S trateg ic 
I nvestment A nd  P ricing  Decisions I n A  C ong ested  T ransport 
C orrid or
N ° 2 0 0 6 - 0 1   Delhay e E.  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  T he Enforcement O f S peed ing :  S hou ld  F ines B e 
H ig her F or R epeated  O ffences?  
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2 0 0 5
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 1 0     R ou sseau  S . ,  B illiet C .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  H ow  to d etermine fining  b ehaviou r in 
cou rt?  G ame theoretical and  empirical analy sis 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 9   Du nkerley  F . ,  d e P alma A .  and  P roost S .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  A sy mmetric Du opoly  
in S pace   w hat policies w ork?  
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 8   R ou sseau  S .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  T he u se of w arning s w hen intend ed  and  
measu red  emissions d iffer 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 7   P roost S . ,  V an d er L oo S . ,  d e P alma A . ,  L ind sey  R .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  A  cost-   
b enefit analy sis of tu nnel investment and  tolling  alternatives 
in A ntw erp 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 6   d e P alma A . ,  L ind sey  R .  and  P roost S .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  R esearch challeng es in 
mod elling  u rb an road  pricing :  an overview  
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 5   M oons E. ,  R ou sseau  S .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  P olicy  d esig n and  the optimal location 
of forests in F land ers 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 4   M ay eres I . ,  P roost S .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  T ow ard s  b etter transport pricing  and  
tax ation in B elg iu m 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 3   P roost S . ,  S en A .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  UR B A N  T ransport pricing  reform w ith T WO  
levels of g overnment 
N ° 2 0 0 5 - 0 2   M oons E. ,  S avey n B . ,  P roost S . ,  H ermy  M .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  O ptimal location of 
new  forests in a su u rb an area